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CV MDI QKD: Composable Security against Coherent Attacks
Cosmo Lupo, Carlo Ottaviani, Panagiotis Papanastasiou, Stefano Pirandola
Department of Computer Science, University of York, York YO10 5GH, UK
We present a rigorous security analysis of Continuous-Variable Measurement-Device Independent Quantum
Key Distribution (CV MDI QKD) in a finite size scenario. The security proof is obtained in two steps: by
first assessing the security against collective Gaussian attacks, and then extending to the most general class
of coherent attacks via the Gaussian de Finetti reduction. Our result combines recent state-of-the-art security
proofs for CV QKD with new findings about min-entropy calculus and parameter estimation. In doing so, we
improve the finite-size estimate of the secret key rate. Our conclusions confirm that CV MDI protocols allow
for high rates on the metropolitan scale, and may achieve a nonzero secret key rate against the most general
class of coherent attacks after 107− 109 quantum signal transmissions, depending on loss and noise, and on the
required level of security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum communication technologies, and in particu-
lar quantum key-distribution (QKD), are rapidly progressing
from research laboratories towards real-world implementa-
tions. The ultimate goal is building a network of quantum
devices (quantum internet) enabling unconditionally secure
communications on the global scale [1–4]. To this end, QKD
has been recently extended to a scenario where two honest
users (Alice and Bob) exploit the mediation of an untrusted
relay, operated by the eavesdropper (Eve), to establish a se-
cure communication channel [5, 6]. This remarkable feature
is made possible by the working mechanism of the relay it-
self, which activates secret correlations on the users’ remote
stations by performing Bell detection on the incoming sig-
nals and publicly announcing the results [6]. This architec-
ture has been called measurement-device independent (MDI)
QKD because, as such, the security of the communication
does not rely on the assumption that the measurement devices
(which are more exposed to side-channel attacks than other
devices) are trusted [5, 6].
Protocols exploiting quantum continuous variables (CV)
have attracted considerable attention, for their potential of
boosting the communication rate and for their employabil-
ity across mid-range (metropolitan) distances [6, 7]. The key
rates achievable by CV QKD protocols are not far from the ul-
timate repeater-less bound for private communication, which,
for a lossy line of transmissivity η is − log (1− η) bits per
use [8]. The security of CV QKD, which is very well estab-
lished under Gaussian attacks and in the asymptotic regime
[9], has been recently generalized to the most general class of
coherent attacks as well as to the finite-size setting [10–14]. In
this landscape, the problem of establishing the secret key rates
achievable by CV MDI QKD in the finite-size setting has not
been yet explicitly addressed.
In this paper we fill this gap and provide a rigorous
composable-security proof of the CVMDI QKD protocol pro-
posed in Ref. [6] (this proof can then be extended to tripartite
[15] and multipartite CV MDI protocols [16]). The security
of CV MDI QKD against collective attacks can be obtained
along the lines of Ref. [10]. Then, the extension to the most
general class of coherent attacks can be obtained by exploit-
ing the recently introduced Gaussian de Finetti reduction [11].
Here we apply to CV MDI QKD and improve the proof tech-
niques of Ref. [10]:
1. We present a simpler analysis of parameter estimation
that holds under general coherent attacks. Our analy-
sis exploits the recently proven optimality of Gaussian
attacks in the finite-size scenario [11] to simplify pa-
rameter estimation.
2. We show that in CV MDI protocols, the parameter es-
timation routine can be performed locally by the legiti-
mate users with almost no public communication.
3. We improve the secret-key rate estimates of Ref. [10]
by exploiting a new entropic inequality.
The paper develops as follows. We start in Section II by
reviewing the CV MDI QKD protocol of Ref. [6]. Section
III is devoted to our new results about parameter estimation
and its statistical analysis. In Section IV we present an im-
proved estimation of the secret key rate obtained by applying
a new entropic inequality. A comparison with previous works
is presented in Section V. To make our results more concrete,
numerical examples are presented in Section VI. We finally
discuss the relation between security proof and experimental
realization and possible improvements in Section VII. Finally,
conclusions are presented in Section VIII.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROTOCOL
In this section, we review the CV MDI QKD protocol in-
troduced in Ref. [6].
The protocol develops in five steps (see Fig. 1):
1. Coherent states preparation. Alice and Bob locally
prepare 2n coherent states, whose complex amplitudes
α′ = (q′A + ip
′
A)/2 and β
′ = (q′B + ip
′
B)/2 are drawn
i.i.d. from circular symmetric, zero-mean Gaussian dis-
tributions with variance V AM and V
B
M , respectively [17].
The initial random variables of Alice and Bob are re-
spectively denoted as X ′ = (q′A, p
′
A), Y
′ = (q′B, p
′
B).
2. Operations of the relay. The 2n coherent states are sent
to the relay. For each pair of coherent states received the
2FIG. 1: The figure shows the scheme of the CV MDI QKD protocol
as described in details in Section II. Single lines represent bosonic
modes, double lines classical variables. Time evolves from left to
right. Alice and Bob initially prepare coherent states by applying
displacement operators DA, DB to the vacuum state |0〉, according
to the value of their local classical variables. The coherent states are
collected by the relay that, through some (unknown) physical trans-
formation, outputs a classical variable Z and gives to Eve quantum
side information. Finally, Alice and Bob apply classical displace-
ment dA, dB , conditioned on the value of Z, to their local classical
variables.
relay publicly announces a complex value γ = (qZ +
ipZ)/2.
3. Parameter estimation. Alice and Bob estimate
the covariance matrix (CM) of the variables
(q′A, p
′
A, q
′
B, p
′
B, qZ , pZ).
4. Conditional displacements. Alice and Bob define the
displaced variables α = (qA + ipA)/2 and β = (qB +
ipB)/2 such that
qA = q
′
A − gq′A(γ) , (1)
pA = p
′
A − gp′A(γ) , (2)
qB = q
′
B − gq′B (γ) , (3)
pB = p
′
B − gp′B (γ) , (4)
where g⋆, for each ⋆ = q
′
A, p
′
A, q
′
B, p
′
B , is an affine
functions of γ. As shown in Ref. [19], the optimal
choice is to define the functions as
g⋆(γ) = u⋆ qZ + v⋆ pZ , (5)
where [20]
u⋆ =
〈⋆ qZ〉〈p2Z〉 − 〈⋆ pZ〉〈qZpZ〉
〈p2Z〉〈q2Z 〉 − 〈qZpZ〉2
, (6)
v⋆ =
〈⋆ pZ〉〈q2Z〉 − 〈⋆ qZ〉〈qZpZ〉
〈q2Z〉〈p2Z〉 − 〈qZpZ〉2
. (7)
We remark that the parameters u⋆, v⋆ can be computed
directly from the estimated CM.
5. Classical post-processing. The variables X =
(qA, pA), Y = (qB, pB) represent the local raw keys of
Alice and Bob, respectively. To conclude the protocol,
the raw keys X , Y are post-processed for error correc-
tion and privacy amplification. We assume without loss
of generality that error reconciliation is on Alice’s raw
key.
The CV MDI QKD protocol described above has two main
characteristic features. The first is that Alice and Bob does
not apply any measurement, as the only measurement is per-
formed by the untrusted relay. This property defines the pro-
tocol as MDI [5, 6]. The second feature is that the correlations
between Alice and Bob are generated through the variable Z
announced by the relay. As explained in details in Ref. [19],
this property allows Alice and Bob to do parameter estima-
tion with a negligible amount of public communication [21].
Therefore, they can exploit the whole raw key for both param-
eter estimation and secret key extraction.
Finally we remark that, although the variables X and Y
have in principle infinite cardinality, in practice they are al-
ways specified by a finite number of digits. Furthermore, for
the finite-size analysis of the protocol (as well as for other
practical issues), one needs to map the unbounded and contin-
uous variables X , Y to some discrete and bounded variables
X¯ , Y¯ . The mappingsX → X¯ , Y → Y¯ can be realized by an
Analog to Digital Conversion (ADC) algorithm. We therefore
assume that X¯ and Y¯ are discrete variables with cardinality
22d (i.e., d bits per quadrature).
III. PARAMETER ESTIMATION
In this Section we discuss how Alice and Bob can estimate
the CM of the variables (qA, pA, qB, pB). Without loss of gen-
erality we can assume that these variables have zero mean and
the CM has the form
VAB = 〈


q2A qApA qAqB qApB
pAqA p
2
A pAqB pApB
qBqA qBpA q
2
B qBpB
pBqA pBqB pBqB p
2
B

〉 = ( xI zIzI yI
)
,
(8)
where I = diag(1, 1), and
x =
〈q2A〉+ 〈p2A〉
2
, (9)
y =
〈q2B〉+ 〈p2B〉
2
, (10)
z =
〈qAqB〉+ 〈pApB〉
2
. (11)
Clearly, the entries on the principal diagonal of (8) can be
estimated locally by either Alice and Bob. It remains to esti-
mate the off diagonal term z. This can be done in three differ-
ent ways:
1. The traditional way is that Alice and Bob exchange part
of the data via a public channel to estimate the corre-
lation terms 〈qAqB〉 and 〈pApB〉. Clearly, in order to
do so they have to disclose part of the raw key, thus re-
ducing the final secret-key rate. Suppose that, over a
3total of n signals exchanged, Alice and Bob usem < n
signals for parameter estimation, thus allowing an er-
ror in the estimation of the order of m−1/2. Then only
the remaining n −m < n signals remain available for
secret key extraction (i.e., error correction and privacy
amplification).
2. As noted in Ref. [10] (see also [22]) a rough estimate of
the signal-to-noise ratio is sufficient for Alice and Bob
to run the error correction routine before performing pa-
rameter estimation. Then, a verification step is done to
ensure that the initial estimate was accurate enough. In
this way Alice and Bob can exploit virtually all the raw
data for key generation.
3. For our MDI protocol Alice and Bob can exploit the
relations (see Section II)
qA = q
′
A − uq′AqZ − vq′ApZ , (12)
pA = p
′
A − up′AqZ − vp′ApZ , (13)
qB = q
′
B − uq′BqZ − vq′BpZ , (14)
pB = p
′
B − up′BqZ − vp′BpZ , (15)
to obtain
z =
〈qAqB〉+ 〈pApB〉
2
=
= w1〈q2Z〉+ w2〈p2Z〉+ w3〈qZpZ〉 , (16)
where we have defined
w1 :=
1
2
(
uq′
A
uq′
B
+ up′
A
up′
B
)
, (17)
w2 :=
1
2
(
vq′
A
vq′
B
+ vp′
A
vp′
B
)
, (18)
w3 :=
1
2
(
uq′
A
vq′
B
+ vq′
A
uq′
B
+ up′
A
vp′
B
+ vp′
A
up′
B
)
. (19)
Since the variances 〈qZ〉, 〈pZ〉 and the covariance
〈qZpZ〉 can be locally computed by the users, then this
implies that Alice and Bob can do parameter estimation
without publicly announcing their local data [21]. In
conclusion, in this way Alice and Bob can exploit all
their raw data for both parameter estimation and secret
key extraction.
Here we follow the latter approach because, in contrast with
the first approach and in analogy with the second one, it re-
quires only a constant (and hence negligible) amount of pub-
lic communication. Furthermore, the third approach exploits
the very structure of the MDI protocol and therefore appears
to be the most natural in this context.
A. Statistical analysis of parameter estimation
We are then left with the problem of estimating the confi-
dence interval associated with the statistical estimation of the
CM of (qA, pA, qB, pB). It is worth stressing that this is a
remarkably complex problem in the case of general collec-
tive attacks (see Ref. [10]). By contrast, this task becomes
straightforward under the assumption of collective Gaussian
attacks. Unlike other authors [23–25], our analysis of param-
eter estimation under collective Gaussian attacks does not rely
on the central limit theorem and is therefore mathematically
rigorous in the finite-size setting (see instead Ref. [26, 27] for
a statistical analysis of parameter estimation in CVMDI QKD
that exploits the central limit theorem).
Our analysis is based on the assumption that the
(q′A, p
′
A, q
′
B, p
′
B, qZ , pZ) are Gaussian variables. This as-
sumption comes with no loss of generality because:
• The variables (q′A, p′A, q′B, p′B) are Gaussian by defini-
tion of the protocol;
• The optimality of Gaussian attacks in the finite-size sce-
narion has been established in Ref. [11]. This implies
that the variables (qA, pA, qB, pB) can be assumed to
be Gaussian without loss of generality;
• In principle, the variables (qZ , pZ) are not necessar-
ily Gaussian. Notwithstanding, by inverting Eqs. (12)-
(15) we can write (qZ , pZ) as linear combinations of
(qA, pA, qB, pB) and (q
′
A, p
′
A, q
′
B , p
′
B). Since the latter
are assumed to be Gaussian, and since a linear combi-
nation of Gaussian variables is also Gaussian, it follows
that (qZ , pZ) are Gaussian variables too.
First consider the estimation of, say, 〈q2Z〉, whose estimator
is the empirical variance n−1
∑n
j=1 q
2
Zj . Given that qZj are
i.i.d. Gaussian variables [28], then the empirical variance is
distributed (up to rescaling) according to a chi-squared distri-
bution. Therefore, a confidence interval can be readily ob-
tained applying the cumulative distribution function of the
chi-squared distribution, or tail bounds for it.
Second, consider the estimation of the correlation 〈qZpZ〉.
We apply the identity
〈qZpZ〉 = 1
4
〈(qZ + pZ)2〉 − 1
4
〈(qZ − pZ)2〉 , (20)
whose estimator
1
n
n∑
j=1
qZjpZj =
1
4n
n∑
j=1
(qZj + pZj)
2− 1
4n
n∑
j=1
(qZj − pZj)2
(21)
is distributed as the sum of chi-squared variables. Therefore,
for each chi-squared variable, we can compute a confidence
interval, and then obtain a confidence interval for the quanti-
ties x, y, and z in (8) by error propagation.
An explicit calculation of the confidence intervals is pre-
sented in Appendix C.
IV. IMPROVED RATE ESTIMATION
The security proof against collective or Gaussian attacks
can be obtained along the lines of Ref. [10]. Here we
4present an improved estimation of the conditional smooth
min-entropy obtained by applying a new entropic inequality.
We assume without loss of generality that the reconciliation
is on Bob’s variable Y¯ . The number of (approximately) secret
bits that can be extracted from the raw key is lower bounded
by the smooth min-entropy of Y¯ , conditioned on the quantum
state of the eavesdropperE′ as well as on the classical variable
Z [29]:
sǫ+ǫs+ǫECn ≥ Hǫsmin(Y¯ |E′Z)ρn−leakEC(n, ǫEC)+2 log (2ǫ) ,
(22)
where we have also subtracted the information leakage
leakEC(n, ǫEC) due to error correction. The security parame-
ter ǫ + ǫs + ǫEC comprises of three terms: ǫ comes from the
leftover hash lemma, ǫs is the smoothing parameter entering
the smooth conditional min-entropy, and ǫEC is the error in
the error correction routine. Since conditioning does not in-
crease the entropy, for any purification ρnABE of ρ
n
ABE′Z we
have
Hǫsmin(Y¯ |E′Z)ρn ≥ Hǫsmin(Y¯ |E)ρn , (23)
which implies
sǫ+ǫs+ǫECn ≥ Hǫsmin(Y¯ |E)ρn − leakEC(n, ǫEC) + 2 log (2ǫ) .
(24)
A crucial point of the security proof is the estimation of
the conditional smooth min-entropyHǫsmin(Y¯ |E)ρn . Here we
present an approach that yields a bound on the min-entropy
that is tighter than the one of [10]. For collective (or collective
Gaussian) attacks, the state ρn is a tensor-power, i.e., ρn =
ρ⊗n. On the other hand, the state that is actually used for key
generation is the one conditioned upon error correction being
successful. Because error correction has a non-zero failure
probability, the conditional state is no longer guaranteed to be
a tensor-power. Indeed, the conditioned state has the form
τn = p−1Πρ⊗nΠ , (25)
whereΠ is a projector operator (projecting on the subspace in
which error correction does not abort), and p = Tr(Πρ⊗nΠ)
is the probability of successful error correction. Let us recall
that the security parameter ǫ can be interpreted as the prob-
ability that the protocol is not secure (see Appendix A for a
review). Therefore, the probability that the protocol is not se-
cure, given that it does not abort, cannot be larger than ǫ/p.
This suggests a relation of the form
Hǫmin(Y¯ |E)τn ≃ Hpǫmin(Y¯ |E)ρ⊗n . (26)
As a matter of fact we can prove the following
Theorem 1 Given two n − qudits states τn and ρ⊗n such
that τn = p−1Πρ⊗nΠ for some projector operator Π and
p = Tr(Πρ⊗n), then
Hǫmin(Y¯ |E)τn ≥ H
2
3
pǫ
min (X¯|E)ρ⊗n + log
(
p− 2
3
pǫ
)
. (27)
The proof is presented in Appendix B.
Theorem 1 implies that the state can still be assumed to be
a tensor-power upon replacing ǫ → 23pǫ and shortening the
secret key by log
(
p− 23pǫ
)
bits, that is,
sǫ+ǫs+ǫECn ≥ H
2
3
pǫs
min (Y¯ |E)ρ⊗n − leakEC(n, ǫEC)
+ log
(
p− 2
3
pǫs
)
+ 2 log (2ǫ) . (28)
The conditional smooth min-entropy of the tensor-power
state ρ⊗n can be estimated using the Asymptotic Equiparti-
tion Property (AEP), which yields a bound in terms of the von
Neumann conditional entropy [30]:
Hδmin(Y¯ |E)ρ⊗n ≥ nH(Y¯ |E)ρ −
√
n∆AEP(δ, d) ,
where
∆AEP(δ, d) ≤ 4(d+ 1)
√
log (2/δ2) (29)
is also a function of the dimensionality parameter d.
The next step in the security proof is to estimate the condi-
tional entropy
H(Y¯ |E)ρ = H(X¯)ρ − I(X¯;E)ρ . (30)
Let us first consider the estimation of the mutual informa-
tion I(Y¯ ;E)ρ. We remark that the latter is upper bounded by
the mutual information with the variableX , i.e., I(Y¯ ;E)ρ ≤
I(Y ;E)ρ, since the ADC algorithm cannot increase the mu-
tual information. In turn, the property of extremality of Gaus-
sian states [31, 32] allows us to write the bound I(Y ;E)ρ ≤
I(Y ;E)ρG ≡ IBE , where ρG is a Gaussian state with same
CM as ρ.
To conclude, we notice that the quantity nH(X¯) −
leakEC(n, ǫEC) is the number of (non necessarily secret) bits
of common information shared by Alice and Bob after the er-
ror correction routine. Ideally, in the limit of large block size,
ADC with arbitrarily large precision, and perfect operations,
this quantity is expected to be equal to nI(X ;Y )ρ, where
I(X ;Y ) is the mutual information between Alice and Bob.
Therefore we can put
H(Y¯ )− 1
n
leakEC(n, ǫEC) = βI(X ;Y )ρ , (31)
where the efficiency parameter β ∈ (0, 1) accounts for all
the sources of non-ideality in the protocol. The inequality
βI(X ;Y )ρ ≥ βI(X ;Y )ρG ≡ βIAB , where ρG is the Gaus-
sian state with same first and second moments, follows from
Ref. [32]. Notice that β is also a function of n and ǫEC.
In conclusion, the results presented in this section, com-
binedwith the security proof of [10], yield the following lower
bound on the secret key rate:
rǫ+ǫs+ǫEC+ǫPEn =
1
n
sǫ+ǫs+ǫEC+ǫPEn (32)
≥ βIˆAB − IˆBE − 1√
n
∆AEP
(
2
3
pǫs, d
)
+
1
n
log
(
p− 2
3
pǫs
)
+
1
n
2 log (2ǫ) , (33)
5where IˆAB and IˆBE are the empirical estimates for the mutual
informations, and ǫPE is the probability of error in parameter
estimation.
V. COMPARISONWITH PREVIOUS SECURITY PROOF
Our expression for the rate in Eq. (33) can be compared
to the analogous expression given in Theorem 1 of Ref. [10].
The first difference between the two expressions is in the term
proportional to ∆AEP (that is the leading correction term in
our finite-size analysis), which in Ref. [10] is replaced by [33]
∆
(1)
AEP = (d+ 1)
2+ 4(d+ 1)
√
log
2
ǫ2
+2 log
2
p2ǫ
+4
ǫd
p
√
n
.
(34)
It is clear that ∆
(1)
AEP > ∆AEP, where for small values of p
and ǫ the difference is dominated by the term 2 log 2p2ǫ . We
emphasize that the fact that with our approach we obtain a
smaller finite-size correction∆AEP follows from the applica-
tion of the new min-entropy inequality of Theorem 1.
The expression for the rate in Ref. [10] also includes an
additional error term∆ent, scaling as n
−1/2 logn. In our for-
mulation this terms does no appear and has been somehow
incorporated in the efficiency factor β. We believe that our
approach provides a better way to model what is done in ex-
perimental implementations of the protocol. We remark that
∆ent is the leading finite-size correction term in the analysis
of Ref. [10].
Finally, we exploit the Gaussian assumption to compute the
confidence intervals for parameter estimation. The result (see
Appendix C) is that the elements of the CM can be estimated
up to a relative error of the order of√
8 ln (8/ǫPR)
n
(35)
with a given overall probability of error smaller than ǫPR. This
result is comparable with that of Ref. [10]: the reason is that,
although Ref. [10] considers general collective attacks, the
analysis of the parameter estimation is effectively reduced to
the Gaussian setting by applying a randomization technique.
Although we obtain finite-size correction related to parame-
ter estimation that are quantitatively similar to Ref. [10], our
statistical analysis is much simpler. This is due to the fact
that we exploit the assumption of a Gaussian attack which has
been proven to come without loss of generality even in the
finite-size setting [11].
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
The expression in Eq. (33), together with the parameter
estimation analysis of Section III, allows us to compute the
estimated secret-key directly from experimental data for any
Gaussian attack (and then extend to general attacks using the
results of Ref. [11]). In this Section, as an example, we com-
pute the rate as function of loss and block size for the case of
FIG. 2: As an example, in Section VI we consider the case of inde-
pendent entangling cloner attacks on the two communication lines,
where τA and τB are the beam-splitter transmissivities. The at-
tacks also introduce independent excess noises of variances ξA =
(1− τA)(ωA − 1), ξB = (1− τB)(ωB − 1). The relay applies Bell
detection on the incoming modes, whose result define the variable Z
and is publicly announced.
an entangling cloner attack (depicted in Figure 2). We con-
sider two settings:
1. symmetric attacks in which both communication lines
from Alice to the relay and from Bob to the relay are
wiretapped with a beam-splitter with equal transmissiv-
ity τA = τB = τ ;
2. asymmetric attacks where the relay is assumed very
close to Alice station, τA ≃ 1.
In both cases, following Ref. [6], the eavesdropper collects
all the loss from the communication lines, and the variable Z
is the outcome of a perfect Bell detection performed at the
relay. These kinds of attacks have been characterized thor-
oughly in Ref. [6], where the asymptotic rate (in the limit of
infinite block size) has been computed as:
r0n = βIˆAB − IˆBE , (36)
where the mutual informations are bounded by the results of
parameter estimation. In our example we choose the conser-
vative value β = 0.95 [34–37]. (Notice that in principle the
factor β is a function of n and ǫEC, but for the sake of illus-
tration we assume it to be constant.)
Putting 〈q′A2〉 = 〈p′A2〉 = 〈q′B2〉 = 〈p′B2〉 = VM , we
obtain
〈q′AqZ〉 = −
√
τA
2
VM , (37)
〈p′ApZ〉 =
√
τA
2
VM , (38)
〈q′BqZ〉 = 〈p′BqZ〉 =
√
τB
2
VM , (39)
and the covariances of mutually conjugate quadratures vanish.
We also have 〈qZpZ〉 = 0 and
〈q2Z〉 = 〈p2Z〉 =
τA + τB
2
VM + 1 +
ξA + ξB
2
=: ν , (40)
6where ξA = (1 − τA)(ωA − 1), ξB = (1 − τB)(ωB − 1) are
the excess noise variances and ωA,B are the thermal noise that
Eve injects in the links respectively (see Eq. (1) of Ref. [6]).
The only non-vanishing displacement coefficients are
uq′
A
= −
√
τA
2
VM
ν
, (41)
vp′
A
=
√
τA
2
VM
ν
, (42)
uq′
B
= vp′
B
=
√
τB
2
VM
ν
, (43)
that imply
w1 = w2 = −
√
τAτB
4
V 2M
ν2
, (44)
and w3 = 0. Finally, applying Eq. (C9) we obtain
zmin =
√
τAτB
2(1 + t)
V 2M
ν
, (45)
and similarly, from Eq. (C8),
xmax =
VM
1− t
(
1− τA
2
VM
ν
)
, (46)
ymax =
VM
1− t
(
1− τB
2
VM
ν
)
, (47)
with t =
√
n−1 8 ln (8/ǫPE) (see Appendix C).
For collective Gaussian attacks, Eq. (33) is rewritten as
rǫ
′
n ≥ r0n −
1√
n
∆AEP
(
2
3
pǫs, d
)
+
1
n
log
(
p− 2
3
pǫs
)
+
1
n
2 log (2ǫ) , (48)
where ǫ′ = ǫ+ ǫs+ ǫEC+ ǫPE. In Figs. 3, 4 this rate is plotted
vs the block size n, for different values of the transmissivities
and excess noise for error correction efficiency of β = 95%.
The plots are obtained putting p = 0.99, ǫ = ǫs = ǫEC =
ǫPE = 10
−21, hence obtaining an overall security parameter
ǫ′ < 10−20. We also put d = 5: with this choice of d the
error in the Shannon entropy due to the ADC is less than 1%.
The rate is then obtained by maximizing over the value of
modulation VM .
For coherent attacks, by applying the results of Ref. [11]
we obtain
rǫ
′′
n ≥
n− k
n
r0n −
√
n− k
n
∆AEP
(
2
3
pǫs, d
)
+
1
n
log
(
p− 2
3
pǫs
)
+
1
n
2 log (2ǫ)
− 1
n
2 log
(
K + 4
4
)
, (49)
where k is the number of signals used for the energy test,K ∼
n and ǫ′′ = K
4
50 ǫ
′.
10 7 10 8 10 9 10 10 10 11
n
10 -4
10 -2
10 0
r n
 
(bi
ts/
 us
e)
FIG. 3: Secret key rate vs block size for asymmetric attacks: τA =
0.99 and different values of τB (from top to bottom the attenuation
of the communication line from Bob to the relay is of 1dB, 2dB,
and 4dB). The excess noise is ξA = 0 and ξB = 0.01 (in shot noise
unit). Solid lines are for collective Gaussian attacks, and dashed lines
are for coherent attacks. For both kinds of attack, the overall security
parameter is smaller than 10−20.
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FIG. 4: Secret key rate vs block size for symmetric attacks and dif-
ferent values of τA = τB (from top to bottom the symmetric attenu-
ation is of 0.1dB, 0.3dB, 0.5dB, and 0.55dB). The excess noise is
ξA = ξB = 0.01 (in shot noise unit). Solid lines are for collective
Gaussian attacks, and dashed lines are for coherent attacks. For both
kinds of attack, the overall security parameter is smaller than 10−20.
In Figs. 3, 4 this rate is plotted vs the block size n, for
different values of the transmissivities and excess noise, for
error correction efficiency of β = 95%. The plots are obtained
for ǫ = ǫs = ǫEC = ǫPE chosen in such a way to obtain
ǫ′′ < 10−20. The rate is then obtained by maximizing over k
and the modulation VM and for p = 0.99.
VII. DISCUSSION
In the case of coherent attacks, the major bottleneck limit-
ing the rate of secret bits generation per second comes from
the classical post-processing, and in particular the active sym-
7metrization routine, due to the typically large size of the data
set. While it has been conjectured that such an active sym-
metrization might not be actually needed [11], it remains an
open theoretical problem to find a security proof that does not
require to perform such a computationally costly operation.
Here we present two arguments supporting the conjecture
that the active symmetrization routine may not be actually per-
formed in any experimental realization of the protocol:
1. The active symmetrization routine consists in Alice and
Bob multiplying their local raw keys by a random ma-
trix. Since the matrix is invertible and publicly known,
such an operation cannot by any means increase the se-
cret key length. Therefore, we deduce that the same
secret key rate might be achieved even without perform-
ing the symmetrization routine;
2. The symmetrization routine is also instrumental for the
energy test. After the symmetrization operation, Alice
and Bob estimate the expectation value of the energy
from only a relatively small part of the raw key. We
notice that Alice and Bob can obtain an even better esti-
mate of the mean energy from the whole raw key. This
suggests that the symmetrization step might be avoided
without affecting the energy test.
In summary, these two arguments suggest that the require-
ment of performing the symmetrization routine might be a ar-
tifact of the particular technique used to prove the security and
therefore might not be strictly required in a practical realiza-
tion of the protocol.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a rigorous assessment of the security
of CV MDI QKD in the finite-size regime. Our results are
obtained by applying and modifying the results of Ref. [10],
also exploiting the Gaussian de Finetti reduction recently in-
troduced in Ref. [11], together with new results on parameter
estimation and a new min-entropy inequality. Because of this
improvements, our estimate on the secret-key rate is improved
with respect to results of [10, 11].
In doing this, we have shown that for our MDI protocol all
the raw data can be used for both parameter estimation and
secret key extraction. Such a unique feature is a consequence
of the fact that correlations between Alice and Bob are en-
coded in the variable that is publicly announced by the relay
— even though such a variable does not contain information
about the secret key (see Ref. [19]). It might be possible that
for the same reason the security analysis of MDI QKD can
be further simplified, in particular the energy test and active
symmetrization routines. It is worth remarking that standard
one-way protocols, in both direct and reverse reconciliation,
can be simulated by an MDI one, simply by assigning the re-
lay to either Alice and Bob [6]. For this reason, this unique
property of MDI QKD can be readily extended to the one-way
setting [19].
Our statistical analysis of parameter estimation is fully
composable and does not rely on the central limit theorem
(and therefore is mathematically rigorous in the finite-size set-
ting). Notwithstanding, we do not expect that our approach
gives tight bounds on the statistical error induced by parame-
ter estimation. In fact, tighter bounds may be obtained follow-
ing a different approach, for example by invoking the central
limit theorem as in Ref. [26, 27].
We have shown that it is in principle possible to generate
secret key against the most general class of coherent attacks
for block sizes of the order of 107 − 109, depending on loss
and noise, and on the required level of security. Therefore, our
results indicate that a field demonstration of CV MDI QKD
might be feasible with currently available technologies. In
particular, our composable security analysis confirms that CV
MDI protocols allow for high QKD rates on the metropolitan
scale, thus confirming the results of the asymptotic analysis
first discussed in Ref. [6].
Note added: after the completion of this work, other au-
thors have independently presented a security analysis of CV
MDI QKD obtained by exploiting entropic uncertainty rela-
tions [38]. Although directly applicable to obtain security
against coherent attacks, this approach is known to provide
bounds on the secret key rate that in general are not tight.
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Appendix A: Operational interpretation of the security
parameter
Ideally, in QKD one would like to obtain a shared key that
is truly random and secret to the eavesdropper. The final state
of a protocol that successfully distributes s perfectly secret
bits would be represented by a density operator of the form
ρ0 = 2
−s
2s−1∑
x=0
|x〉A〈x| ⊗ |x〉B〈x| ⊗ σE . (A1)
In reality, one can only hope to get as close as possible to such
an ideal scenario. Let ρ denote the final state of a given QKD
protocol. The extent to which the state ρ approximates the
ideal one ρ0 is often quantified in terms of the trace distance,
D(ρ, ρ0) =
1
2
‖ρ− ρ0‖1 = 1
2
Tr|ρ− ρ0| . (A2)
The trace distance has several desiderable properties for
a good security quantifier [29, 39, 40]. In particular, here
we discuss its interpretation in terms of the probability that
8the generated key is secret. It is well known that the opera-
tional meaning of the trace distance is related to the problem
of quantum state discrimination [41]. Suppose one is given
a black box containing either ρ or ρ0, each with probability
1/2. Then any measurement strategy, compatible with the
principles of quantum mechanics, allows one to distinguish
between the two states up to an error probability [42]
pe ≥ 1−D(ρ, ρ0)
2
. (A3)
Let us define a binary random variable U with probability
distribution PU = (pe, 1 − pe). As a matter of fact U char-
acterizes the distinguishability of the states ρ and ρ0, that is,
between the output of the given QKD protocol and an ideal,
perfectly secure one. For example, if the state happens to co-
incide with the ideal one, we have PU = Psec = (1/2, 1/2).
On the other hand, if the state can be perfectly distinguished
from the ideal one, PU = Pinsec = (0, 1).
PuttingD(ρ, ρ0) = ǫ we can write
PU =
(
1− ǫ
2
,
1 + ǫ
2
)
= (1− ǫ)Psec + ǫPinsec . (A4)
Therefore, the probability distribution of the variable U char-
acterizing the output of the QKD protocol is the convex sum of
the probability distribution Psec associated to the ideal output
state and the probability Pinsec associated to a state that can
be perfectly distinguished from the ideal one. In conclusion,
such a convex sum decomposition of PU allows us to interpret
1− ǫ as the probability that the output of the QKD protocol is
indistinguishable from the ideal one, and thus, for all practical
purposes is itself perfectly secure. In other words, the proba-
bility that the output of the protocol is not perfectly secure is
smaller than ǫ. Assuming the worst case scenario, below we
put ǫ equal to the probability that the key is not secret.
Taking abstraction on the state and focusing on the protocol
itself, this same reasoning is extended to the direct comparison
of two protocols E and E0, formally represented as completely
positive maps, via the diamond norm
‖E − E0‖⋄ = sup
σ
‖(E ⊗ I − E0 ⊗ I)σ‖1 , (A5)
where the supremum is over all input states and the maps are
extended to including an ancillary system.
Appendix B: Some properties of smooth entropy
One of the main tools for quantifying the security of QKD is
the conditional smooth min-entropy. In this Appendix we re-
view some of the main definitions and properties (see [29, 30]
for the proofs) and derive a useful inequality in Proposition 6
that is applied for our security proof.
Definition 2 [Conditional min-entropy] The min-entropy ofA
conditioned on B of the bipartite state ρAB is
Hmin(A|B)ρ := max
σ
sup
{
λ : ρAB ≤ 2−λIA ⊗ σB
}
,
(B1)
where I is the identity operator and σ is a subnormalized
state.
Here we are interested in the conditional min-entropy
of classical-quantum (CQ) states of the form ρXB =∑
x∈X P (x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ω(x). In this case the conditional min-
entropy can be written in terms of the maximum guessing
probability:
2−Hmin(X|B)ρ = max
E
∑
x∈X
P (x)〈x|E(ω(x))|x〉 , (B2)
where E is a quantum channels.
The following holds:
Lemma 1 Let ρ =
∑
x∈X P (x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ω(x) be a CQ state
and S a subset of X . We define the projector operator Π =∑
x∈S |x〉〈x|, and the state p−1ΠρΠ, with p = Tr(ΠρΠ). The
following inequality holds:
Hmin(X |B)p−1ΠρΠ ≥ Hmin(X |B)ρ + log p . (B3)
Proof: By applying the characterization of the min-entropy
in terms of the guessing probability we obtain:
2−Hmin(X|B)p−1ΠρΠ = max
E
∑
x∈S
p−1P (x)〈x|E(ω(x))|x〉
(B4)
≤ p−1max
E
∑
x∈X
P (x)〈x|E(ω(x))|x〉
(B5)
= p−12−Hmin(X|B)ρ (B6)
= 2−Hmin(X|B)ρ−log p . ✷ (B7)
The smooth conditional min-entropy of ρ is defined as the
maximum min-entropy in a neighborhood of ρ:
Definition 3 (Smooth conditional min-entropy) The
smooth conditional min-entropy of A conditioned on B of the
state ρAB is
Hǫmin(A|B)ρ := max
ρ˜
Hmin(A|B)ρ˜ (B8)
where ρ˜ is a ”smoothing state” such that D(ρ˜, ρ) ≤ ǫ, with
D(ρ˜, ρ) denoting the trace distance.
Remark 4 Here we have defined the entropy smoothing us-
ing the trace distance as in Ref. [29] instead of the purified
distance as done in Ref. [30].
Remark 5 For a CQ state ρ it is sufficient to consider smooth-
ing states that are classical on the same support as ρ [30].
Therefore there exists a CQ states ρ⋆ such that D(ρ⋆, ρ) ≤ ǫ
and
Hǫmin(X |B)ρ = Hmin(X |B)ρ⋆ . (B9)
9Lemma 2 Let us consider two CQ states ρ =∑
x∈X P (x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ω(x) and ρ⋆ =
∑
x∈X P⋆(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗
ω⋆(x) such that D(ρ, ρ⋆) ≤ ǫ, and a projector operator
Π =
∑
x∈S |x〉〈x|. Then D(p−1ΠρΠ, p−1⋆ Πρ⋆Π) ≤ 32p−1ǫ ,
where p = Tr(ΠρΠ) =
∑
x∈S P (x) and p⋆ = Tr(Πρ⋆Π) =∑
x∈S P⋆(x).
Proof. First notice that the trace distance between the two CQ
states reads
D(ρ, ρ⋆) =
∑
x∈X
D(P (x)ω(x), P⋆(x)ω⋆(x)) , (B10)
and thatD(ρ, ρ⋆) ≤ ǫ implies
|p− p⋆| ≤ ǫ . (B11)
We then have
D
(
p−1ΠρΠ, p−1⋆ Πρ⋆Π
)
=
∑
x∈S
D
(
p−1P (x)ω(x), p−1⋆ P⋆(x)ω⋆(x)
)
(B12)
≤
∑
x∈S
D
(
p−1P (x)ω(x), p−1P⋆(x)ω⋆(x)
)
+D
(
p−1P⋆(x)ω⋆(x), p
−1
⋆ P⋆(x)ω⋆(x)
)
(B13)
=
∑
x∈S
p−1D (P (x)ω(x), P⋆(x)ω⋆(x))
+
1
2
∣∣p−1 − p−1⋆ ∣∣P⋆(x)‖ω⋆(x)‖1 (B14)
=
∑
x∈S
p−1D (P (x)ω(x), P⋆(x)ω⋆(x))
+
1
2
p−1p−1⋆ |p− p⋆|P⋆(x) (B15)
≤ p−1ǫ+ 1
2
p−1ǫ (B16)
=
3
2
p−1ǫ , (B17)
where in the first inequality we have applied the triangular
inequality and in the last one we have applied Eqs. (B10)–
(B11). ✷
We are now ready to present a ”smoothed” version of
Lemma 1:
Proposition 6 Let ρ =
∑
x∈X P (x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ω(x) be a CQ
state and S a subset of X . We define the projector Π =∑
x∈S |x〉〈x|, and the (normalized) state τ = p−1ΠρΠ,
where p = Tr(ΠρΠ). The following inequality relates the
conditional smooth min-entropies of ρ and τ :
Hǫmin(X |B)p−1ΠρΠ ≥ H
2
3
pǫ
min (X |B)ρ + log
(
p− 2
3
pǫ
)
.
(B18)
Proof. Let ρ⋆ be a CQ state such that D(ρ, ρ⋆) ≤ 23pǫ.
Lemma 2 implies that D(p−1ΠρΠ, p−1⋆ Πρ⋆Π) ≤ ǫ. We
then upper bound the conditional smooth min-entropy of τ =
p−1ΠρΠ as follows:
Hǫmin(X |B)p−1ΠρΠ ≥ Hmin(X |B)p−1⋆ Πρ⋆Π (B19)
≥ Hmin(X |B)ρ⋆ + log p⋆ (B20)
= Hǫ
′
min(X |B)ρ + log p⋆ (B21)
≥ Hǫ′min(X |B)ρ + log (p− ǫ′) , (B22)
where in the first inequality we have applied the fact that
p−1⋆ Πρ⋆Π is ǫ-close to p
−1ΠρΠ, in the second inequality we
have applied Lemma 1, the first equality is obtained choosing
a ρ⋆ that verifies Eq. (B9) with ǫ
′ = 23pǫ, and the last inequal-
ity is obtained from Eq. (B11). ✷
1. Dealing with the non-zero probability that the protocol
aborts
The assumption that the state ρ⊗n is a tensor product is jus-
tified for collective attacks. However, since error correction
has non-zero probability of aborting, one should consider the
conditional probability of obtaining a secret key given the pro-
tocol did not abort. Unfortunately, the state conditioned on the
protocol not aborting is no longer guaranteed to have a tensor
product structure.
The state ρ⊗n, that describes the correlations between
Bob’s output measurement and Eve, is a classical-quantum
(CQ) state of the form:
ρ⊗n =
∑
xnyn
P (xn, yn)|xn〉〈xn| ⊗ |yn〉〈yn| ⊗ ωE(xnyn) ,
(B23)
where P (xn, yn) is the probability of a sequence of symbols
xn, yn and ωE(x
nyn) is the corresponding conditional state
of Eve. The protocol does not abort only on a given subset S
of the sequences xnyn, therefore the state for a non-aborting
protocol reads
τn = p−1Πρ⊗nΠ , (B24)
where Π =
∑
xnyn∈S |xn〉〈xn| ⊗ |yn〉〈yn| is a projector op-
erator, and p = Tr(Πρ⊗nΠ) is the normalization factor.
Proposition 6 in Section B yields a simple relation between
the conditional smooth min-entropies of ρ⊗n and τn, namely
Hǫmin(X |E)τn ≥ H
2
3
pǫ
min (X |E)ρ⊗n + log
(
p− 2
3
pǫ
)
,
(B25)
where p is interpreted as the probability that the protocol does
no abort.
Appendix C: Tail bounds
The cumulative distribution function of the chi-squared
variable χ2(k) with k degrees of freedom is F (x; k) =
Γ[k/2,x/2]
Γ[k/2] , where Γ[k/2] is the Euler Gamma function, and
Γ[k/2, x/2] is the lower incomplete Gamma function.
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To bound the cumulative distribution function we can use,
for example, the tail bounds:
Pr
{
k <
χ
1 + t
}
< e−nt
2/8 , (C1)
Pr
{
k >
χ
1− t
}
< e−nt
2/8 . (C2)
(These bounds are derived from the Chernoff bound using the
fact that distribution of χ2(k) is sub-exponential with param-
eters (2
√
k, 4)).
A direct application of these bounds yields
Pr
{
〈q2Z〉 <
n−1
∑
j q
2
Zj
1 + t
}
≤ e−nt2/8 , (C3)
Pr
{
〈q2Z〉 >
n−1
∑
j q
2
Zj
1− t
}
≤ e−nt2/8 , (C4)
together with similar bounds for the quantities 〈p2Z〉, 〈q2A〉,
〈p2A〉 〈q2B〉, 〈p2B〉.
We also obtain
Pr
{
〈qZpZ〉 >
n−1
∑
j(qZj + pZj)
2
4(1− t) −
n−1
∑
j(qZj − pZj)2
4(1 + t)
}
≤ Pr
{
〈(qZ + pZ)2〉 >
n−1
∑
j(qZj + pZj)
2
(1− t)
}
+ Pr
{
〈(qZ − pZ)2〉 <
n−1
∑
j(qZj − pZj)2
(1 + t)
}
≤ 2e−nt2/8 , (C5)
and analogously
Pr
{
〈qZpZ〉 <
n−1
∑
j(qZj + pZj)
2
4(1 + t)
− n
−1
∑
j(qZj − pZj)2
4(1− t)
}
≤ 2e−nt2/8 . (C6)
This implies
Pr {x > xmax} ≤ 2e−nt
2/8 , Pr {y > ymax} ≤ 2e−nt
2/8 , Pr {z < zmin} ≤ 4e−nt
2/8 , (C7)
with
xmax =
1
1− t
∑
j
q2Aj + p
2
Aj
2n
, ymax =
1
1− t
∑
j
q2Bj + p
2
Bj
2n
, (C8)
and
zmin = min
s1,s2,s3∈{−1,1}
∣∣∣∣∣w1n
−1
∑
j q
2
Zj
1 + s1t
+ w2
n−1
∑
j p
2
Zj
1 + s2t
+ w3
(
n−1
∑
j(qZj + pZj)
2
4(1 + s3t)
− n
−1
∑
j(qZj − pZj)2
4(1− s3t)
)∣∣∣∣∣ , (C9)
where w1, w2 and w3 are defined in Eqs. (17)-(19).
For example, putting
t =
√
8 ln (8/ǫPE)
n
(C10)
we finally obtain
Pr {x > xmax ∨ y > ymax ∨ z < zmin} ≤ ǫPE . (C11)
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